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In the end to talk about parks is to talk about the city as much as about what landscape 
architecture is, and what landscape architects can do 
Jusuck Koh and Anemone Beck, Parks, People and City 
Conceptualizing digitization and globalization…creates operational and rhetorical openings for 
recognizing the ongoing importance of the material world even in the case of some of the most 
dematerialized activities. 
Saskia Sassen, The Hybrid Space 
Diasporic public spheres, diverse among themselves, are the crucibles of a postnational political 
order. The engines of their discourse are mass media (both interactive and expressive) and the 
movement of refugees, activists, students, and laborers. It may well be that the emergent 
postnational order proves not to be a system of homogenous units (as with the current system of 
nation-states) but a system based on relations between heterogonous units (some social 
movements, some interest groups, some professional bodies, some nongovernmental 
organizations, some armed constabularies, some judicial bodies). 
 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large 
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Introduction 
Where does the park end and where does the city begin? Can we talk about the park without 
relating it to the city? While the park is centered within the cityscape as its social and leisure 
public domain, it is also decentered from the dominant functional ethos of urbanity. The 
architects Jusuck Koh and Anemone Beck alert us to the direction that contemporary parks are 
taking, becoming more distanced and cosmopolitan, conditioned for peripheral consumption by 
the passersby. What seem to diminish are the nurturing, local and intimate designs of the urban 
park that evokes sensuality, belongingness and a sense of community.  In making their case for a 
more vibrant ecology of public leisure space, they suggest a dismantling of conventional 
boundaries between the park and the city: 
As much as possible a park should not be bounded or bordered in a zone defined by city 
planners or a social sector. It must be open: visually, socially and ecologically. It also 
needs to be programmatically open to change, open to participation of community, open 
to aesthetic participation of users by using comprehensible formal languages, and open to 
momentary or time-share ownership of the users. Desirably, an urban park today could 
reach out into the city like an octopus. Likewise, it could let the city come in with its 
urban uses and activities, with restaurants, theaters, museums, or even complementary 
housing. The result would be a “park in the city” or a “city in the park”, realizing 
necessary interpenetration and mutual complementarity between nature and culture, and 
park and city. (2006:16) 
While indeed the intermingling of these two spheres can be desirable and effective in shaping a 
more livable social environment, boundaries continue, underlining the historical persistence of 
social practice within these realms. When these borders blur, we need to pay attention to points 
of convergence and divergence that are often strategically constructed to evoke a particular 
social vision.  
We have seen the coming of age of urban parks particularly in the 19
th
 century in response to the 
fast growing industrialization of the time. During this period, the state, be it in China, the United 
States or England seemed to share a social vision of the urban park as a spatial strategy to foster 
modern civility and communal feeling. We have witnessed the omnipresence of park formations 
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in dialogue with democracy and urbanization, two globally sweeping phenomenon that signaled 
the rise of the modern society. We have recognized the park as a radical act of the carving of the 
city into an open space marked for the public, to exercise their range of leisure expressions and 
social enactments. Urban parks emerged as a symbolic, political and ideological landscape 
worldwide. One can argue that it is impossible to experience the park without the larger 
experience of the inhabited city. While distinct cultural practices mark these topographies, the 
park and the city undoubtedly share certain common architectures and social infrastructures. 
They are both in constant play with forces that demand control. Both spheres are subject to the 
practicalities of design for standardization and uniformity to feed our need for efficiency. At the 
same time, social inhabitation of these spaces compel for plurality and creativity as the needs of 
a range of people and institutions strive to leave their mark on these landscapes.  
Parallels between varied forms of the urban park and social network sites have been explicitly 
drawn to bring to the fore the privatization, commercialization and politicization of public leisure 
space.  In this paper, we embark on two missions: the first is to situate the urban park as part of 
the larger cityscape and the second is to underline its global implications. In parallel fashion, to 
frame social networking sites as part of the larger Internet domain and the second is to underline 
the globalizing of the digital leisure commons. This is not as ambitious as it seems. Over the 
decades, the relationship between the digital commons and the material commons has matured, 
catalyzed by the metaphor. We have learnt to conceptualize the Internet through analogies to 
grasp its information highways, networks, the underlying logic dictating movement and nodes of 
concentrated social action. William J. Mitchell’s influential book, ‘City of Bits: Space, Place, 
and the Infobahn’ (1996) laid a solid foundation for comparison of the Internet to the city. His 
prophetic perspective on the web as ‘soft cities’ highlights the underlying infrastructures and 
architectures of digital space, calling for a novel way of framing these new techno-social 
domains through a historical and urban approach:  
In a world of ubiquitous computation and telecommunication, electronic augmented 
bodies, postinfobahn architecture, and big time bit business, the very idea of the city is 
challenged and must eventually be reconceived. Computer networks become as 
fundamental to urban life as street systems. Memory and screen space become valuable, 
sought after sorts of real-estate. Much of the economic, social, political and cultural 
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action shifts into cyberspace. As a result, familiar urban design issues are up for radical 
reformulation. (pp. 107). 
Mitchell draws attention to the fact that while digital space appears infinite and freely accessible, 
it is subject to accessibility constraints and regulatory factors: 
If the value of real estate in the traditional urban fabric is determined by location, 
location, location (as property pundits never tire of repeating), then the value of a 
network connection is determined by bandwidth, bandwidth, bandwidth. Accessibility is 
redefined. (p. 17) 
Lawrence Lessig (2006) took this comparison further in his book, ‘Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace,’ provoking us with a spectrum of ramifications on the impact these virtual 
architectures can have if code, its building blocks, can be controlled and regulated by interests 
that are not necessarily democratic and oriented for the common good. He warns us that “we 
must consider the politics of the architecture of the life there” (p. 293). Today, with talk of big 
data structures attempting to cement our digital experiences into predictive moulds, walled 
gardens to envelope our leisure experiences, and the politics of algorithms to influence our 
navigation into specific pathways, this was indeed prescient. By equating the Internet to the city, 
we have been compelled to extend our imagination by applying our understandings of urban 
planning and cultural geography to current conversations on the shaping of the digital commons. 
Another much talked about dimension of these realms is its network potential where dense 
sociality is organized in a multiplicity of ways. Manual Castells’ book ‘Network Society’ (1996) 
is credited to have significantly shaped the global cities scholarship as he mapped these ideas 
convincingly to understand contemporary space. He argues that cities should be viewed not as 
places but as processes, where ideas, good and people flow through, contributing to the rich array 
of relations that attract us to these domains. He introduced the term ‘spaces of flows’ to break the 
conventional notion that cities were bounded entities where communication technologies and 
transportation networks enable these to be more fluid and hybridizing a terrain.   
 
Hence, the persistence of this parallel has matured from the initial utopic notion of the web as a 
novel frontier of limitless and depoliticized western space (Barlow, 1996) to a more architected 
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and socio-economic phenomenon of a propertied and contextual digital place. The Internet realm 
has tremendously benefited from scholarly insights on the material sphere to aid in the 
architecting and conceptualizing of virtual social practice. Interestingly, the ‘city’ itself, while 
lending itself as a tool to illustrate the digital sphere, is in fact going through its own 
metamorphosis. There is no one generic understanding of the city and in fact, within the host of 
cities to choose from, we recognize persistent hierarchies, networks and clusters that resemble 
the core-periphery binary. Certain cities have become templates to emulate, termed as ‘global 
cities’ (Sassen, 2001). These select cities are seen as command centers that serve as a fulcrum for 
the industrial, the creative, the leisurely, and the privileged as well as the temporal laboring and 
migrant class. Similarly, not all social networking sites share the same influence and zone of 
power. Facebook and Twitter for instance are the virtual command centers of the digital age. 
Much like the global city, they are at once stateless and yet, constrained by diverse national laws, 
local socio-cultural politics and practices.  
Thereby, this paper draws heavily from literature on global cities, using this avenue as a 
discursive tool that pushes this analytic further. The metaphorical parallel of the city as the 
Internet is used as a point of departure given that it has been established and elaborated upon 
over the decade. This allows us to move directly to the framing of global cities to capture the 
globalization of digital architectures. We build on this rubric to delve into a segment of the 
Internet that is marked for leisure- that of social networking sites. Taking a cue from global 
cities, this paper offers a proposition to understand the globalizing of digital leisure networks 
through the spatial metaphor of global parks. In prior literature, there has been an emphasis on 
how urban parks in their varied forms reflect dimensions of social networking sites, sharing the 
rhetoric of being democratic, participatory, open and leisure-oriented. While seemingly 
innocuous, we have seen how urban parks have a contentious history in becoming a public and 
democratic space across different cultures and nations and how they are fundamentally universal 
and cross-cultural. Parks share a history of struggle in making and sustaining their spaces as 
public. Here we see that behind the design of urban leisure spaces are intentions, regulations, and 
constraints that are often played with by people that inhabit these spaces. By investigating the 
globalization of the Internet through the lens of the ‘global city,’ we can push our understandings 
on the commonality amongst parks across contexts. Overall, this effort allows us to 
constructively borrow from the field of urban studies and extend important debates surrounding 
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globalization of the material domain to its virtual counterpart- the Internet and its social network 
sites to better confront the political, socio-cultural and economic dimensions of globalization and 
its online/offline intermediations.  
 
THE CITY AND THE PARK 
The industrial revolution brought about massive urbanization in the 19
th
 century, promising 
tremendous economic prosperity and yet, threatening the quality of life. The strapped 
infrastructures of the city designed for productivity left little breathing room for diverse public 
expression. Public parks were seen as a solution, a safety valve. No society can sustain itself on 
purely the pragmatic. People’s needs, desires, aspirations and expressions are fundamental to a 
lived space. Sustainability and regeneration became the underlying premise for the urban park 
movement (Woudstra & Fieldhouse, 2000). Thus, a symbiotic relationship is born where the city 
is nurtured by the presence of its parks and the parks cater to the unmet needs that emerge within 
the city. Since then, expectations of the urban park have risen as scholars have pointed out the 
linkages of these domains to economic, psychological and social prosperity. It pays to have 
leisure. It is productive to recreate. The modern society comes with a social vision and strives to 
embed these values within the aesthetics of park design. For instance, equal access to public 
goods was a new core value, departing from the past practice of urban parks being accessible for 
only a select and privileged population. The future of the community as seen during this time 
was driven by a vision for democracy. Much emphasis was now being placed on bringing a 
diverse group together in these new green commons to create connections and shared interests, 
contributing to the makings of a responsible and socially invested citizen of the city.  
In the makings of these public greens, the municipality was of course spearheading this process. 
Soon enough however, in the name of democracy, a range of actors began to play their part in the 
shaping of these architectures.  For instance, The Amsterdamse Bos located in Amsterdam in the 
Netherlands was designed by the Department of Public Works of Amsterdam, led by the 
architect Cornelis Van Eesteren in collaboration with the landscape architect Jacopa Mulder. 
However the design team was multidisciplinary, constituted by teachers, botanists, biologists, 
engineers, architects, sociologists and town planners (Loures, Santos & Panagopoulos, 2007). 
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This team involvement was seen as useful in conceptualizing the park to meet the needs of the 
modern city and serve as a guardian for its sustainability. In analyzing the urban park models of 
the time such as the Parc André-Citroën in Paris and the City Park of Porto in Portugal, much 
can be attributed to the novel aspect of citizen involvement in the design of public space. Also, 
the location of the park, once on the periphery became now central to city design, occupying 
prime space and defining the character of the city itself. The economic sustainability of the park 
itself led to the growing influence of corporate magnates during the time who donated resources 
to this modern project. The industry was quick to catch on that these seemingly innocuous green 
parks led to a real rise in income and prosperity, impacting the real estate around them and 
enhancing the value of the city amongst the inhabitants. The appeal of these ideas caught on as 
we see the urban park movement spread worldwide during this time. The Victoria Park in 
London and the Central Park in New York served as templates for enlightened park design that 
melded the interest of the city within them. 
It is easy to get swept away in the romance of a globally shared ideation of a public park, and 
accept their design and architectures as normative and inherently positive for social order. After 
all, who hates parks in their neighborhood? Who would dispute a public good such as this for 
their social well-being? Yet, as we should know by now, no domain is completely sacrosanct. 
Jane Jacobs, an American activist of the sixties was seen as an unlikely candidate to influence 
urban planning and renewal. And yet, her book, ‘The Death and Life of Great American cities’ 
(1961) came to be seen as pioneering work that offered concepts that we today take for granted 
such as social capital. She watched closely how the planning establishment would mindlessly 
imitate and transpose models for development onto existing public spheres, without paying heed 
to the contexts within which they would assert themselves. She enjoyed provoking the 
intelligentsia on how urban ‘renewal’ in spite of its futuristic promise, served to create slums. 
She did not hesitate in questioning that which was faithfully revered at the time –that parks are 
good and crowding bad. She argued that at times, parks could be dangerous due to their isolation 
and crowded areas could be the safest spaces to inhabit. 
When we shift our attention to the digital domain, we are poised with a similar symbiotic 
relationship, the internet with that of social networking sites or what O’Reilly terms as its 
‘participatory architectures.’ The internet refers to a global system of interconnected IP 
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networks, datagram structures that enable the exchange and flow of information across 
destinations. It serves as a collection of interconnected documents (web pages) and other web 
resources, linked by hyperlinks and URLs, connecting millions of computing devices. It supports 
a multitude of services such as email, file transfers, interactive video calls (VoIP), online 
communities and of course, social networking sites. In other words, the internet is marked for e-
commerce, e-governance and a host of social and economic activities, among which are digital 
leisure practices. Much of the growth and usage of the internet in the recent decade has been 
attributed to the popularity of social networking sites for entertainment, play and pleasure. In 
fact, the terms internet and Web 2.0 are often used interchangeably, signaling the dominance of 
digital social and leisure platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Cyworld and a multitude of 
media sharing sites, in shaping the perception of the digital commons. The user-generated and 
participatory culture appears to be seeping outside these boundaries and into most digital 
spheres. Today, it is also clear that these leisure domains are deeply commercially viable and 
lucrative, propelling several private sector actors and agencies to adopt such architectures for 
their public outreach. And as Jane Jacobs reminds us, these public spheres, in spite of their 
participatory lure, can also be non-conducive to society. Criminal activity and sexual deviance 
for instance, capitalize on these transnational networks to spread and garner support from a 
diasporic public sphere. While the transnationalism of digital leisure networks have been 
addressed in prior papers, what is yet to be discussed are the makings of command centers within 
this highly competitive landscape, digital and material.  
 
GLOBALIZATION OF THE URBAN AND THE DIGITAL COMMONS 
The Global City, command centers and corporate networks 
Cities are not equal. The understanding of hierarchies within these socio-spatial networks and 
their extent of global reach has been approached in the last few decades through the construct of 
‘global cities.’ This concept’s well-known proponents, John Friedmann, Saskia Sassen, and Peter 
Taylor argue that certain cities due to their economic, political and cultural factors are to an 
extent disembedded from their national systems as they exert their presence in a plurality of 
ways across the globe. Contrary to popular notions of globalization as impervious to borders 
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(Held & McGrew, 2000; Friedman, 2006), Sassen’s innovative argument on the ‘global’ city is 
built on the emphasis of boundaries where the city’s unique centrifugal localization contributes 
to the denationalizing of these structures. In other words, New York, Tokyo, London or Paris 
exists in a bubble zone of particular politics due to their unique capacity to attract and sustain a 
global flow of socio-cultural and economic capital. These cities thereby hardly mirror the larger 
national culture within which they are situated.  
Sassen defined the term ‘global cities’ in her book The Global City (2001) as “strategic sites in 
the global economy because of their concentration of command functions and high-level 
producer-service firms oriented to world markets; more generally, cities with high level of 
internationalization in their economy and in their broader social structure” (p. 154). In reviewing 
the burgeoning literature on this term, the following main characteristics come to light as 
Brenner and Keil frame it (2006, p.11), namely:  
 basing points for the global operations of transnational corporations 
 production sites and markets for producer and financial services 
 articulating nodes within a broader hierarchy of cities stratified according to their 
differential modes of integration into the world economy 
 dominant locational centers within large-scale regional economies or urban fields  
In conceptualizing the ‘global city,’ much weight is given to financial markets in the 
reorganizing of cities’ spatial structures and within it a new transnational class system. Sassen 
(2006) paints the picture of such cities as ‘command points’ of corporate power that fosters a 
formation of networks of not just the financial elite but also of the bulk of the low-paid 
immigrant service workers that sustain these city economies.     
William Carroll (2007) reinforces this linkage between global cities and transnational corporate 
networks in his study but argues for the staying power of nationhood as these entities continue to 
be constrained by regional legalities, politics and economic underpinnings. It is worth 
remembering that corporate power is not a consensual and centralized force but comes with its 
own internal tensions that often are reflective of their specific local/national conditions and 
affiliations. For instance, we cannot assume that the Shell Corporation in the United Kingdom is 
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seamlessly operating along the same lines as Shell in the Netherlands. These organizational 
entities are more segmented in form through their strategic, operational, and allocative features: 
Strategic power occurs at the level of structural decision-making and concerns the 
determination of basic long-term goals and the adoption of initiatives to realize those 
goals. Operational power involves the actual implementation of corporate strategy within 
the head office and in sub-ordinate offices, subsidiaries, and plants. Finally, there is the 
allocative power wielded by financial institutions, whose collective control over the 
availability of capital ``gives them the power to determine the broad conditions under 
which other enterprises must decide their corporate strategies (Scott, 1997, p. 139). 
Thereby, multiple national actors and processes play a role in making a multinational corporation 
and exert influence in the formation and the enactments within a global city. While the state 
continues to exercise its power, this does not negate the fact that in this era of global outsourcing, 
workers in distant nations can and at times do exercise their voice, even when not situated in 
West’s command centers. So continuing with the example of Shell, the regional branch in 
Nigeria was hardly impervious to the pressures that emanated from people of the Kula 
community in the Rivers State that demanded the corporation to keep their promises on 
sustainable development. Or for instance, the disastrous and deadly collapse of the garment 
factory in Dhaka touched a nerve with apparel consumers in global cities such as Berlin, Dublin 
and Helsinki, pushing the multinational garment industry to respond meaningfully to this 
situation in the periphery. Part of this responsive network has to do with the mobility and 
circulation of labor, more sophisticated communication technologies that allow for interactivity, 
engagement and public awareness of local issues.  
While this can serve as a sign of optimism against the normative hegemonic structures that have 
dictated these formations historically, Taylor (2004) points us to the more disturbing potential of 
these inter-urban configurations, that being the making of a ‘new network bourgeoisie’ - a global 
plutocracy. In other words, the main global cities and transnational corporations strategically 
cooperate to sustain their overarching power, setting an urban fabric that is more impenetrable to 
lesser cities and agencies. In fact, the global city concept has come under severe criticism due to 
its bias towards the West, negating the rise and influence of cities in the global South. While 
cities such as New York, Tokyo, Paris, Amsterdam and Berlin get evoked time and again to 
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illustrate their commanding roles, cities in emerging markets gain a fraction of attention. This is 
alarming as the world’s substantive population resides along these peripheries and are gaining 
stride in their influence and reach. While it continues to be argued that unfortunately, power does 
get concentrated and circulated within the traditional Western clan of global cities, in recent 
years however, with the rise of emerging markets, there has been some flux in membership. For 
instance, Mexico City, once deemed a city on the periphery has moved to the core, while certain 
industrial centers like Detroit have been peripheralized (Sassen, 2002).  
These recent trends thereby remind us that global cities per say are not static entities but are 
evolving and transitioning and transforming. It is fairer to term them as ‘globalizing cities’ as it 
better captures the dynamism of this category as different cities compete for this status through 
their ongoing restructuring and reinvention (Marcuse and van Kempen, 2000). Lastly, it is 
important to consider the ramifications that this term can have on communicating a certain urban 
convergence and normalization as cities are compelled across the globe to follow this prescribed 
model, compromising therefore on the range of potential diversity that city formations can 
display. Robinson (2002) denounces this trend by stating that ‘global cities have become the 
aspiration of many cities around the world’ (p. 548) and argues that this can have devastating 
consequences on particularly less economically prosperous cities that are pressured to imitate 
these models at the price of equality in citizen participation, access and usage. Interestingly, this 
has created a new spatial form of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) particularly by BRIC nations 
wherein certain regions within the state gain significant privilege over others through this new 
terrain within which the flow of services are relatively free of state regulation and interference, 
unlike zones outside of this boundary. Hence, global cities can be deliberately architected within 
emerging markets to appear less nationalistic and more international to allow states to compete in 
this digital and global marketplace.  
And finally, another persistent ‘zero-sum’ juxtaposition that seems to circulate is that the ‘global 
city’ is pitted against the state wherein the strength of the city comes at the price of the 
weakening of the state. On the contrary, the nation state may well be behind the rise of certain 
global cities as this strategic maneuvering may help situate the state prominently on the global 
landscape via these chosen global cities. Territorial domination is enabled by privileging certain 
cities to the forefront, creating ‘glocal’ nodes of accumulation and regional competitive 
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advantage (Brenner, 1998). Thereby, it is naïve to assume that the city and the state are 
positioned as diametrically opposite. Instead, the possibility that these actors often collude 
politically and otherwise should be seriously considered.  
Not coincidentally, we find parallel discussions regarding the internet and its globalizing 
potential. Much like a cityscape, the internet is a techno-social infrastructure of nodes and 
networks.  How these structures are connected and mapped on a global scale are of ongoing 
concern. The birth and proliferation of the internet has closely been linked to the phenomenon of 
globalization, some believing that these new digital structures largely circumvent the state and 
create new affiliations that disregard national geography (Graham & Marvin, 2001). Through 
this lens, communication networks are seen to strengthen social relations, creating a culture that 
clusters across borders (Rosen, Barnett & Kim, 2011).  Others argue that it extends the state 
reach and gives it greater control in all social spheres to an unprecedented degree, at times in 
collusion with multinational corporations.  
This conversation can be meaningfully enhanced by borrowing from the global cities literature. 
We need to first identify which are the digital command centers and gauge their sphere of 
influence. Candidates such as Facebook and Twitter for instance come foremost to mind. These 
platforms are indeed appropriated by several nations and are constantly being subject to local 
rules, regulations and policies. If we look at the approach on citizen privacy, the operationalizing 
of these digital infrastructures differ based on whether they are in Europe or in the United States 
due to specific regional policies regarding this issue. Also, in light of the umpteen media stories 
circulated in the last few years on their role in the ‘Arab Spring,’ we recognize their ongoing 
negotiations with different states that attempt to control these digital spaces. Undoubtedly, given 
the global outreach of these digital command centers, it is hardly debated that they have 
tremendous power in dictating the rules of the game. Yet, due to corporate interests, they are 
compelled to cooperate and even yield to the interests of the state time and again. However, if we 
look at the case of China and its dominant social media platforms such as SinaWeibo, Renren, 
Tencent, Douban, and Wechat, they enjoy tremendous support from the state as long as they 
demonstrate sensitivity to the political needs through self-censorship. Hence, it is a mistake to 
frame this conversation as a dichotomy of the state versus the digital command centers and 
instead, to look at the complex interplay of power that circulates between these two entities. As 
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the global cities literature above explicates, at times the state proactively propels certain global 
cities to the forefront to achieve international recognition with the goal of being a major player in 
the transnational domain.   
Interestingly, the core-periphery model that has been used to assess the membership of global 
cities and to gauge whether in fact we are facing a ‘new network bourgeoisie,’ is also found 
applicable in discerning the globalizing of the internet. A study was recently embarked by Park, 
Barnett and Chung (2011) to unravel the relationship between globalization and the Internet by 
looking at changes that have taken place over the years in connectivity by comparing global 
communication networks of countries in 2003 and in 2009. Using network analysis, the research 
was carried out on the web-based network that linked the country code of top level domains that 
represents countries. The results indicate that the 2009 international hyperlink network is 
completely interconnected. G7 countries and Spain are at the center of the network. At the 
periphery are the poorer countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This resonates with the 
global cities clan of primarily command centers situated in the West, propelling us to 
acknowledge the persistence of the digital and material plutocracy that exists in global network 
formations. The study strived to determine whether the internet has become more individualized 
and fragmented or whether this digital space continues to function through the conduit of the 
nation state. What these researchers found was the reigniting of the classic world system theory 
as their data fell along lines of the core, periphery and semi-periphery relations and dependencies 
amongst these states, calling to question the independence of their digital networks. It appears 
then that a nations’ development can be understood by considering “the systematic ways in 
which societies are linked to one another within the context of a larger network of material, 
capital and information exchanges” (Barnett & Park, 2005).   
Much like the global cities analysis where disproportionate attention is given to economic 
aspects while negating the socio-cultural aspects, the analysis of the globalizing of the internet 
has been accused of a similar bias. Thereby, these researchers pay heed to this critique and go 
beyond economic aspects of global communication networks to delve further into claims of 
decentralization, regionalism and cultural pluralism that have been attributed to these platforms. 
It was found that while indeed there was a global system linking these nation states, there were 
also regional clusters around language, culture and geography that circumvented these 
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conventional borders. While it is clear that the world systems theory largely prevails in terms of 
inequality where wealthy nations are more interconnected than the less prosperous, emerging 
markets have undoubtedly made a significant rise on the international stage since 2003 and 
function more stably and centralized as a regional cluster than in the past. Also, it was found that 
while in 2003 the US was central in this mapping, by 2009, it found itself sharing the stage to a 
substantive extent with Europe, particularly with Germany. Also, much attention has recently 
gone into the rise of the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), creating 
tremendous speculation of their role in the shaping of the Internet. It was found that not all 
emerging markets are equal; Brazil and Russia are more hyperlinked to the global stage than 
China and India. Part of this can be explained by the fact that China and India have some of the 
world’s largest internal digital economies to cater to. Despite China’s formidable role in today’s 
global economy, it is far less central in its international hyperlinked network. This has been 
attributed to China taking on different language code systems to create a regional cluster of its 
own, a deliberate effort to shape its walled gardens within the ‘Great Firewall of China.’  
In fact, recent studies have emphasized the heterogeneous nature of the Internet, adopting the 
term ‘Internets,’ once a social meme driven by President Bush’s gaffe with this term, to now a 
more serious proposition. Corporate and state politics are slowly but surely encroaching on this 
digital territory that was originally designed to not be controlled by any one agency, institution or 
state. A case in point is the rise of internets such as the ‘Chinese internet’ with its own digital 
firewall, effectively filtering information flows along the line of the state’s interest (Zhong, 
2012).  Having said that, several examples have been given in the last few papers on how 
Chinese citizens play with these structures to express and advocate, contributing to a far more 
dynamic and complex digital space than the popularly touted authoritarian perspective. Lindtner 
and Szablewicz (2010) argue that China has not one but multiple Internets: 
the interface, content and wider social meaning of Internet technologies today are not 
determined by software developers and designers alone, but rather by a complex web of 
actors, including, but not limited to, users, corporations, state actors and policy makers.  
As such, it is important to acknowledge that online practice, including such things as the 
use of search engines or the creation and modification of digital content, is not divorced 
from cultural processes, e.g. social discourses and political debates. Rather than 
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portraying the rapid changes of the IT landscape in China as a single, unified process, we 
stress the importance of tracing ‘multiple Internets,’ the  development of which are 
contingent upon broader cultural changes such as shifts in socio-economic class, political 
projects of modernization and economic reforms. (p2) 
As corporate, state and other actors with their vested interests contribute to the development of 
the Internet, it becomes clear that there is no one unified agenda and policy dictating the 
direction and nature of this digital geography. This is not to say that there are no hierarchical 
influences amongst these forces. A study examining digital network flows and their overlapping 
with European urban networks to detect economic connectivity found that centrally located 
European cities had a higher influence and degree of information flow as compared to peripheral 
European cities with similar levels of physical connectivity (Derudder et al., 2010). To illustrate, 
the combined cluster of London, Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam is viewed as the ‘Internet 
diamond’ as these global cities serve as important nodes of the European urban and digital 
commons (Tranos & Gillespie, 2011). This power fulcrum is also seen to extend its tentacles 
well beyond the region, marking the European influence on the global Internet backbone 
network. These power politics underpinning the internet infrastructure and character of the 
global network reminds us that select forces shape the internet as a public good.  In spite of the 
affordances of communication technology to foster unprecedented locational freedom and 
mobility, we continue to witness the forces of agglomeration driving the exponential growth of 
the cityscape and the infoscape.  
 
In pursuing this urbanization and digitization of space, perhaps it is more effective at this point to 
adopt a more integrated discursive stance on this subject. This comes at a time where it is evident 
that global cities are becoming more mediatized and digital networks are more entrenched in 
their urban geographies than perceived to be.  For instance, let’s focus on the shift in core-
periphery memberships among cities and the implications on their digital networks. Within the 
emerging market domain, Mexico City, currently number two, will drop to fifth place, while 
Mumbai is forecast to move up from third to second position. Also on the way up are urban areas 
such as Delhi, (up from 6th to 3rd position), Dhaka (up from 10th to 4th) and Lagos (up from 
14th to 7th). While this indeed displays certain dynamism in the periphery categories, what is 
also observed is the simultaneous shift in scale and speed of Internet infrastructures and network 
 
 
16 
 
concentrations of these geographical nodes. In other words, recent studies have demonstrated the 
persistent and staying power of interconnectedness between the virtual and the material domain 
of social life. The Internet and city infrastructures seem to synchronize to create a complex and 
rich understanding of globalization of social networks and structures.  
 
This perspective comes to fruition through state efforts to create a digital presence of its cities as 
‘smart cities.’ This momentum rides on the convergence of online and offline structures through 
spatial mediatization via new technologies (Komninos, Pallot & Schaffers, 2012).  
 
The digital space of cities is also described as a system composed of four concentric 
rings. At the center are the broadband networks, wired and wireless infrastructure, and 
the access devices enabling communication, data collection and exchange. Then, web 
technologies enabling data storage, processing, and visualization constitute a second ring. 
The third ring is composed of digital applications in many different domains of a city for 
e-government, utilities management, and sustainable development. The outer ring is 
constituted of e-services, a few selected applications that achieve developing viable 
business models and offered on a regular basis as services. 
 
The intense localization of these digital cities utilizes ‘mirror’ logic in a sense that there are web-
based representations and reproductions of different zones of the real city. This is designed to 
amplify city functions as well as transform urban configurations of the physical city to sync 
better with its online counterpart. Some interesting examples underway of such an initiative are 
the AOL digital cities that collect tourist and shopping information of the corresponding city 
coupled with local advertising for vertical markets. Other examples include the Digital City 
Amsterdam that is a platform for various community networks and social interaction among 
citizens, the Virtual Helsinki representing a 3D reconstruction of the entire city, and the Digital 
City Kyoto, also representing a 3D virtual space enriched with avatars and offering information 
related to city traffic, weather, parking, shopping, and sightseeing (Ishida, 2000). Also, it is not 
just the core cities that take on a web presence. Sometimes, periphery cities embrace this 
representation so as to gain entry into the core group through the backchannels of the web. There 
is an expectation and hope that its digitization will eventually enhance its real city status. The 
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case of Manchester is a good example wherein it has created a smart city rubric with the intent to 
become more inclusive, creative and sustainable a city through the imaginative use of digital 
applications and services. This illustrates an example of an urban commons’ commitment to 
open innovation through the co-production of new digital services for citizens and tourists alike 
to engage with their city. This comes at a time where the leisure and tourism industry is growing 
exponentially with the rise of the middle class around the world. These systems of urban/digital 
navigation allow a simulation of inhabitation that compels one to engage in both spheres, often 
with positive economic and socio-cultural repercussions.   
 
At this point, there is sufficient evidence to argue the relationship between the construct of global 
cities and the globalization of the Internet, where we see how global cities are gaining a virtual 
presence and digital embodiment while Internet architectures are impacting how we experience 
and architect our lived environments.  This blurring of online and offline social life creates for a 
more integrated understanding of these infrastructures and their political and socio-economic 
dimensions. As a metaphor, the global city serves to understand contemporary shifts in the 
globalizing of the Internet. For starters, we detect a significant shift from a more generic model 
and rubric of the city/Internet to a more heterogeneous and decentralized model of global cities / 
Internets. Recent empirical studies have revealed that there is much in common between these 
two constructs as we witness hierarchies and strategic networks of these command centers.  Be it 
the physical structure of cities or the coded arena of the Internet, they both cannot be viewed in 
isolation but rather, as part of a cluster of domains that are positioned by economic and socio-
political advantages. There is more mobility and dynamism than assumed as these conventional 
power structures are being slowly challenged with the rise of emerging markets, creating a 
diversification in network cultures both materially and digitally. The role of the nation state is far 
from disembedded within these structures as they implicitly and explicitly and in cooperation 
with private-sector entities create walled gardens based on unique arrangements and 
negotiations. In fact, as we have seen, the state need not be diametrically opposed to the global 
city but may be the primary propeller in the creation of these city entities as part of the statehood 
agenda to compete on the international playing field.  
 
Transnational public spheres, the global-rural and the cultural metropolis  
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There was mention earlier on of the creation of digital clusters that circumvent national borders, 
based on cultural commonalities such as language, political alignment and media interests. 
Numerous studies have explored the makings of a transnational public sphere in the age of new 
communication technologies that emerge in response to contemporary events and flows. For 
instance, the ‘Islamic public sphere’ addresses the global alignments in the religious arena while 
the ‘diasporic public sphere’ situates the migration of people and their sense of identity on a 
global stage (Fraser & Nash, 2013). Crucial to this space is a sense of inclusivity and democracy 
in participation that is not defined primarily by the state but on other rules of the game that are 
more specific to the culture of these spaces. As one would expect, these spheres do not come 
without critique. In some sense, popular framing of the transnational public sphere have fallen 
into similar trappings of Jürgen Habermas’s public sphere theory. This classic Habermas 
perspective was accused to be mainly informed by a Westphalian political imaginary while 
espousing egalitarianism. Feminists and multiculturalists and antiracists had a field day picking 
these notions apart as much evidence substantiates the fact that participation is rarely equal and 
constitutive powers in place influence these domains to favor certain select groups and people. 
We have seen this in the past papers in the makings of the public park as well as numerous 
examples on gender, race, and ethnicity bias on a range of social media platforms.   
 
Hence, this discursive formation of communities around aspects other than nationalism is 
certainly not new. Arjun Appadurai addressed this subject about two decades ago in his book, 
‘Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization’ (1996).  In this work, he provides a 
much needed framing that continues to be used today to tackle the nebulous notion of 
globalization. He offers spatial metaphors such as ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, 
financescapes, and technoscapes to critically construct networks of culture that are at once local 
and global. Particularly of relevance here is his emphasis on the history and geography of a 
context to enable for a more grounded discourse surrounding its cultural traffic. After all, there is 
no ‘new’ inhabited territory that is independent of its old layers of people, cultures and things. 
The old and new intermingle and often reinvigorate one another. In his recent book, ‘The Future 
as Cultural Fact’ (2013) he pushes us further in this journey of ideas by enveloping us with a 
complexity of networks that make a global phenomenon. For instance, the diamond trade, he 
elaborates, is not just situated in the global cities of London, Antwerp and New York but is 
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deeply connected with extreme violence in places of the periphery such as Sierra Leone, Congo 
and Angola as well as the marketing middlemen in India. Thereby, the ‘production of locality’ of 
say a global city like Antwerp, is deeply affected by these global cultural flows. In this age of 
digital and material networks, he reminds us that we need to be more critical of our 
understandings of ‘flows’ that these networks generate. He suggests that we “distinguish the 
problem of circulation from the problem of connectivity” (65) when examining their levels of 
influence. This is illustrated with an example of Turkish guest workers circulating to a high 
degree between Turkey and Germany and yet, there is far less connectivity between these two 
cultures.  
 
Keeping this in mind, how do we make sense of the numerous emerging digital platforms and 
applications that promise to transcend locality? Today mobile technology Apps are being 
designed with a global diaspora in mind. Digital audiences promise to be fragmented, fractured 
and at time fictionalized as local, while in reality they are everywhere and everyone. Several of 
these participatory sites such as Wikipedia (the global encyclopedia), Kickstarter (one of the 
world’s largest crowdfunding sites for creative projects) and Groupon (an international discount 
and marketing site) appear to be digital command centers in their own right. Much like global 
cities, these entities feed on transnational alliances and appear to be bounded, not by the state but 
by their unique cultural sphere that keeps their audiences faithful to these virtual localities. In 
fact, if we are to illustrate this further with the example of Groupon, we find that their sphere of 
influence is wide-ranging and global, spreading across Europe, Asia, South America and North 
America with 35 million registered users worldwide. While founded in Chicago, this is hardly a 
Chicago platform any longer. Yet, if we are to examine its production of locality, its practices are 
deeply embedded in the historical practice of coupons, discounted gift certificates to be used at 
the local supermarket or restaurant. For this digital platform to thrive and scale in diverse 
locations, there is much effort that goes into creating alliances with specific local companies, 
municipalities, and service industries of each city they enter. Their offers reflect the local cultural 
needs and demands and desires and not some abstract consumption of global products and space. 
In fact, these are fundamentally local in nature while subscribing to a global template of digital 
discounting. Taking a cue from Appadurai’s framework, the connectivity may be high in a sense 
that audiences on the Groupon site can participate and engage at a global level if they so desire. 
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However, as it plays out, their circulation of consumption practices is deeply localized to the 
nearby restaurants and their favorite food market.  
 
Interestingly, a new trend is emerging that recognizes the power of locality and seeks to directly 
cater to this traditional village-like aspiration. As urbanization becomes the signature of our time, 
we may find ourselves lost in the crowd. Some platforms leverage on this fundamental concern 
where we ask ourselves -how is it that we do not know our neighbor but we are well acquainted 
with an online stranger? If we have the time to fight for a global cause, why not invest in local 
politics too? Should we not act locally if we are to globally engage? This ethnos has given birth 
to several web spaces such as SeeClickFix, a platform in the area of city governance that enable 
users to report non-emergency issues for improving the neighborhood and the city, and 
Localocracy that gathers citizens, government officials and journalists to discuss and learn about 
local politics and priorities. The rise of the social networking site Nextdoor, builds on the 
mission to get to know your neighbors. Their digital manifesto reads as such: 
 
We are for neighbors 
For neighborhood barbecues. For multi-family garage sales. For trick-or-treating 
We're for slowing down, children at play. 
We're for sharing a common hedge and an awesome babysitter. 
We're for neighborhood watch. Emergency response. And for just keeping an eye out for 
a lost cat. 
We believe waving hello to the new neighbor says, ‘Welcome’ better than any doormat. 
We believe technology is a powerful tool for making neighborhoods stronger, safer 
places to call home. 
We're all about online chats that lead to more clothesline chats. 
We believe fences are sometimes necessary, but online privacy is always necessary. 
We believe strong neighborhoods not only improve our property value, they improve 
each one of our lives. 
We believe that amazing things can happen by just talking with the people next door. 
We are Nextdoor. We are simply you and your neighbors, together. 
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The burgeoning of these particular transnational public spheres is seen as part of the ‘slow 
movement,’ a social response to the pressures of society to accelerate, catch up and embrace the 
speed. With new communication technologies, there is deep concern among a growing number 
of people that human relations are being rushed. If we want to have meaningful connectivity, we 
need to deliberately slowdown in our engagements and reflections of the day to day. This 
movement currently claims 83,000 members in 50 countries, which are organized into 800 
Convivia or local papers. The World Institute of Slowness has been set up to teach the way of 
slowness and how it can be instilled in all walks of life. This has spawned an entire genre of 
slowness including that of Slowart, Slowcity, Slowcoffee, Slowdesign and Slowtravel. This is 
not a Luddite approach. Instead, there is an effort to make new media spaces work to serve ones 
desired culture rather than have the speed culture thrust upon you. 
 
Further, when we talk about global cities, it is worth remembering that the idea of the city 
emerges from the larger dichotomy of the urban-rural divide. So when we attribute the 
globalizing of its spaces, are we to assume that the rural landscape is the much assumed staid, 
catatonic arena impervious to this discussion and thereby situated on the outside, excluded and 
disassociated? On the contrary, Lise and Peter Nelson argue that the ‘global rural’ needs to be 
incorporated in this discussion as new trends of gated communities and new city constructions 
targeted for an international and elite diaspora, particularly in emerging markets challenge our 
conventional perception of boundaries of a global city. These socio-spatial fragmentations are 
characterized as ‘new spaces of exclusion’ (Broudehoux, 2007, p.387) heading towards the 
‘ghettoization by choice of the rich’ (Nelson & Nelson, 2011, p. 543). Furthermore, a larger 
trend can be observed, not just in economically prosperous regions but also in lesser states 
wherein spaces of leisure are permeating these productive-oriented cityscapes to an 
unprecedented degree. A fast growing consumerist culture is gaining ground within these scapes 
and with this, a unique form of spatial organization, consumer expectation and need (Dupont, 
2011). 
 
These global rural spaces of exclusion have a significant impact on the distribution of access of 
the digital sphere. We have come across numerous examples in the Corporate Parks and Walled 
Gardens papers that illustrate how the formation of material gated structures align with the deep 
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digital divide that pervades our time. From China, India to the Middle East, the rise of special 
digital and economic zones is seen as endemic to urban and digital policy-making. Take for 
instance the Dubai Internet City (DIC), an information technology park created by the 
government of Dubai. This is structured as a free economic zone to attract multinational 
companies to station themselves within this arena. It is seen as a crucial strategy for this region to 
become a key player in this competitive digital and material sphere and has led many global 
information technology firms, such as Microsoft, IBM, Oracle Corporation, Sun Microsystems, 
Cisco, HP, Nokia, Cognizant and Siemens, as well as UAE based companies such as i-mate, 
Acette, to move their regional base to the DIC. It is further strengthened by the neighboring 
industrial clusters such as Dubai Media City and Dubai Knowledge Village. However, this has 
consequences on how the government distributes access to quality digital infrastructures among 
its people, privileging certain zones over others.  
 
Part of this drive, especially among emerging markets is to be recognized as a serious player in 
this global arena. As these states gain a new sense of self-confidence, it becomes important for 
them to exercise their new found power. It becomes a matter of pride that they are equal 
consumers and can compete within this transnational public sphere. So it’s not a coincidence that 
they are adopting the Silicon Valley template and with that, often comes the embracing of 
‘foreign’ and ‘Western’ emblems of status. For instance, Delhi is seen as a city that is currently 
vying for the position of ‘global city’ as it breeds a new host of shopping multiplexes with 
primarily foreign retail chains offering brand name goods and services, devoted to an exclusive 
and cosmopolitan clientele. These spaces symbolize an aspiration for a global culture that is 
implicitly ‘foreign’ and ‘Western.’ Basically, the global city comes with an expansive ideology 
that privileges certain consumption patterns over others and this preference is architected through 
institutional and regulatory measures such as formulating laws on what constitutes as appropriate 
spaces and activities of consumption, differing from state to state. However, it is not necessarily 
a process of imitation: 
 
Although the middle classes’ cultural aspirations have played a critical part in the global 
drive observed in India’s big cities, the new consumption patterns backing physical 
transformations may be part of a global modernity without necessarily being reducible to 
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an imitation process of mere Westernization … In Delhi, this is best illustrated by the 
recently built ‘hi-tech religious and nationalist theme park’ devoted to a reconstructed 
Vedic civilization and Hindu identity, the Akshardham Temple complex, on the banks of 
the Yamuna river, whose conception draws on many ideas from Disneyland and 
Hollywood studios…Akshardham is analysed as the embodiment of a process of ‘moral 
consumption’ characterizing a fraction of the middle classes that ‘can take part in the 
process of [foreign] modernity, but also ‘pull back’ and return to ‘tradition’ to preserve 
its ‘true’ Indianness…The anxieties engendered by the destabilizing contradictions 
between globalization and national identity may thus produce a ‘hybridized form of 
globality’…(Dupont, 2011, pp.  548) 
This ropes us into the much discussed McDonaldization of the cultural landscape where concerns 
surface on the extent of standardization, Westernization and uniformity that globalization brings 
to the table. These discussions are balanced by the localization and appropriation scholars that 
emphasize how even a city’s ‘global’ cache is in actuality its local environment and culture 
instead of some generic international lifestyle. For instance, Yen-Fen Tseng (2011) in his study 
of Shanghai, captured the perceptions of skilled Taiwanese immigrants who placed significant 
value to the unique and distinctive charms of the local environment; “skilled migrants are not as 
hypermobile as imagined. They value the cultural attractions and lifestyles associated with 
particular destinations, and are inclined to put down roots once they have settled in a new place 
they call home” (p. 766). It is important to acknowledge here that this creative class that is 
mobile and has exposure to other global cities shares a demand that is common to other skilled 
labor across the globe in what constitutes as a quality of place. Richard Florida states this elusive 
quality emanates from an assemblage of ‘thick’ labor markets, lifestyles, social interaction, and 
diversity of a cityscape (2002: 32). Hence, the ‘global’ in a city can be very much indigenous in 
nature and the staying power of the global and supposedly hypermobile migrants are often tied to 
the value they place in the culture of the place.  
Another study that sought to move away from such disambiguation of migrants focused on 
automotive designers to determine how characteristics of places influenced the designers’ 
migration and settlement patterns (Molotch, 2002). What was found was that beyond simple job-
market considerations, certain types of designers tended to prefer specific cities, due to the 
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lifestyles, subcultures and leisure activities that characterize each place. This brings to our 
attention the role that leisure and culture play in the shaping of meaning of such spatial 
constructs. While the discourse has been dominated by economic and financial concerns, 
scholars such as Soja (2000) have emphasized the cultural dimension, framing the global city as 
a ‘cultural metropolis.’ After all, these spatial configurations are lived architectures where 
motivations are not merely driven by the pragmatic but also the affective. People seek for 
meaning and value in a place of inhabitation and sometimes its social memory can have a 
powerful impact on such choices. A good example can be drawn from Tseng’s analysis (2011) of 
how the Taiwanese feel towards Shanghai where their “affection can be traced back to collective 
memories formed by representations in literature and films, such as images of old Shanghai 
represented in many films based on the work of famous writer and Shanghai native Eileen 
Chang” (p. 776).  
In fact, hypermobility and digital migration are topics also discussed when concerning 
movements within the Web 2.0 sphere as the barriers of entry are low and mobility of users are 
high. Whether we want to enter the portals of Amazon or Couchsurfing, all it takes is setting up 
an account. We have witnessed the mass digital exodus of audiences from MySpace to Facebook 
as well how Google+ in spite of their draconian strategies to get people to socialize in their 
space, is so far failing to do so. We are supposed to be an attention deficit and detached populace 
that moves with the digital herd. Particularly, the digital natives are supposed to be digital 
migrants at heart as they flirt with multiple platforms and Apps. Yet, for the most part, this is not 
so. Instead, we have a vast number of examples that illustrate that people invest their time and 
energy into the making of their profiles and networks on specific digital sites and make it their 
‘home.’ They take ownership of their space and nurture their profile to build a more credible 
position in these online communities. Some audiences align their identities deeply with certain 
platforms, seeing themselves as Reddit people or ‘Couchsurfers’ and these come with hierarchies 
within the membership clan based on how often you post, your tone online, your mediation skills 
and how you play by the rules of the game. New research into audience participation on social 
media platforms in poverty entrenched areas of the global South elude to the deep aspirations 
that youngers have as they go about befriending strangers from exotic and Western countries to 
enhance their social capital on platforms such as Orkut and Facebook (Rangaswamy & Cutrell, 
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2012). Thereby, we need to recognize the nuanced differences among inhabitants of these spaces, 
moving away from holistic groupings.  
To conclude, the transnational public sphere serves as a unifying meta-narrative driven by a 
compelling idea and propelled by the rise of new digital connectivity and circulations of people, 
products and ideas. Whether or not this concept had initial empirical evidence seems now less 
relevant as they have been reified through the concentration of resources, intellectual, financial 
and social, acting as a magnet for skilled labor (Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2012). Sometimes, 
these have dark ramifications as we have explored earlier on where certain ‘global cities’ dictate 
the new economic order while lesser cities starve for capital. There is a challenge of subscribing 
to a normative ideal as these global structures become more sophisticated, reflecting complex 
needs and demands of pluralistic audiences. It is seen that these supposed hypermobile migrants 
desire more rootedness than posited, and the intense localization of their inhabited space plays a 
large role in their loyalty to the domain, be it digital or material. Clusters form along lines of 
language, taste, and political affiliation that need not collide with nationalism. It is worth 
considering the application of ‘globalizing cities’ as more appropriate a metaphor for the 
globalizing of the internet as dynamism is the inherent quality that is valued in both domains.  
While markets play an important role in the position of these select spheres, culture continues to 
matter and can supersede the pragmatic. While the classic core-periphery dichotomy has been 
applied to the understanding of networks, these are not essentializing categories but have more 
mobility than is portrayed. It is popularly assumed that the state is losing relevancy but as 
revealed here, it is not a simple zero-sum game of the state versus the global city. They can be in 
fact key propellers of certain domains to reach a global stage, be it a digital platform or a 
material sphere. And while the template that circulates in the architecting of these spaces can be 
rather uniform in nature, they hybridize as they gain usage. Lastly, the digital migrants are less 
uprooted as it may seem, as they yearn for stability and community, needs that have shaped the 
simplest of social groups from time immemorial.   
 
GLOBALIZATION OF DIGITAL LEISURE NETWORKS 
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So far, effort is made to tie the discourse of the global city to the globalizing of the internet by 
borrowing from discussions within urban planning and cultural geographies. The intent is to 
create a channel of transference through the vibrant metaphor of the ‘global cities’ to facilitate 
discussions on the globalizing of the internet. This section takes this further, focusing on the 
arena of the internet that is demarcated for primarily social and leisure purposes- its social 
networking sites. These digital leisure networks have managed to carve a substantive niche and 
facilitate a cultural shift within the internet sphere. Marked by social relations and leisure 
generated activity, Web 2.0 spaces have been attributed to create novel digital markets and 
online business models that come with significant economic and social value. Yochai Benkler’s 
‘Wealth of Networks’ (2006) and Henry Jenkins’ ‘Convergence Culture’ (2006) laid the 
foundation of tying cultural production and consumption to economic processes, with a special 
focus on labor-based practices. To investigate the globalizing of digital leisure spaces and the 
issues that pervade, it is important to situate them within the larger internet infrastructure. As 
suggested at the start of this paper, given that the ‘city’ has served as a useful metaphor to 
understand the internet, then why not extend these benefits by using the ‘global city’ as a 
metaphor for the globalizing of the internet and ‘global parks’ within the cityscape to address 
digital leisure networks.  
For starters, it is important to understand that social networking sites share much of their 
underlying architectural qualities with that of the internet - they draw upon virtual and overlay 
networks, cloud-computing architecture, network management and traffic engineering, 
addressing and routing architectures, IP network architectures and protocols, monitoring and 
traffic analysis, resilient networks (fault tolerance, network recovery, self-healing), cross-layer 
design and optimization, mobility (user, device, service, network), content-centric networks, 
broadband access technologies, resource allocation, switching and routing, and network 
virtualization (Papacharissi and Mendelson, 2011). Among these leisure sites, peer-to-peer 
networks and user-generated content prevail as an overarching and international template, 
allowing them to fit well under the larger ‘global parks’ construct. However, there are also 
distinct lexical structural differences among sites such as Friendster, MySpace, Facebook, Orkut, 
and Renren that make these sites intensely localized in terms of their cultural space and yet 
globalized in terms of their legal and economic status. For instance, social activity was tracked 
on such sites and it was found that across different platforms, few actors personalized their 
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platform by modifying their default settings such as for privacy (Acquisti & Gross, 2006). Yet, 
behaviors developed within such architectural confines that were indeed diverse, based on the 
nature of communication, relations and membership of such networks.  While these sites enjoy a 
certain global status through their shared design rubric, certain arenas such as privacy make these 
platforms uniquely political and tied to the eccentricities of the specific nation state within which 
usage happens. 
Similarly, we have witnessed how the urban park as an innovative public sphere was adopted 
across nations in the 19
th
 century and with that, expectations of nurturing urban civility, 
controlling social unrest and signaling modernity on the world stage. Yet, each park comes with 
its own narratives and historic dramas. There is a genre of parks marked by politics such as the 
People’s Park in Berkeley, and another genre of parks marked for walled leisure consumption by 
the elite class such as the Gramercy Park in New York. In fact, this book has revealed a spectrum 
and typology of urban parks based on the overarching gendered, political, commercial, corporate 
and ethnic cultures and social practice. Each of these genre of urban parks subscribe to a certain 
transnational public sphere that is not dominantly characterized by their state and yet, to 
understand the quotidian relations that unravel in these spaces, the locality of politics and 
eccentricity of embedded social practice comes to the fore.  
Sometimes, there is an overt state commitment to not be part of the transnational public sphere, 
as it is viewed as coming at the price of nationhood. Warlaumont (2010) points out that some 
nations such as France are more protectionist in nature and this outlook shapes the very culture 
pervading architectures of their digital platforms.  Numerous state media policies apply pressure 
to take on a more ‘French’ cultural form. 
For instance, after being allowed to maintain tariffs and quotas to protect its cultural 
market from other cultural products, especially American films and television, in 2003 
France consumed only 60 per cent of American film products as opposed to 85 per cent 
in other European film markets (Riding, 2003, p. 9B). In an effort to preserve the French 
language the French government enacted the Toubon Law (penned in 1994 by French 
Cultural Minister, Jacques Toubon), mandating the use of the French language in all 
official and commercial publications, and imposing fines on the French media for using 
Americanisms or English where French equivalents exist. A few years later, another law 
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mandated quotas requiring the majority of songs on the radio be in French (Wikipedia). 
Hence, these efforts were a way for the French government to put a cog in the wheel of 
the perceived ‘steamrolling’ of the English language. 
 
While new media technologies foster new digital network spaces, they still have to often comply 
with traditional national and cultural policies that have been dictating older communication 
platforms. To be exempt from these policies would mean to make a case that these architectures 
are novel and radically divergent from existing communication platforms, a case that is 
tremendously difficult in this deeply interconnected and mediated era, not just online and offline 
but between different old and new social networks.  What is daunting however, in the case of 
France for instance is that as cultural boundaries get tightened, command centers such as 
Facebook gain membership across borders. France’s Facebook membership alone increased a 
phenomenal 518 per cent over the course of 2008. Google’s YouTube, was the top ranked video 
site in France, with 25 million people watching 2.3 billion videos online in May 2008. This was 
in spite of concerns by French government officials who claim these particular sites have the 
strongest potential for American dominance and imperialism (Instant Messaging, 2009). 
 
Also, we cannot escape the fact that labor circulation, however global it appears to be, is one of 
the most guarded territories of the nation state. In light of users on digital leisure platforms 
laboring to produce content, these seemingly free and voluntary activities are hardly impervious 
to complex labor relations framed by legal systems that are nationally based. Adam Fish (2011) 
expounds on the nature of labor within these transnational leisure networks and the challenges in 
governance of such practices.  He argues that to address this critically, we need to go beyond the 
staid binary of viewing these digitally distributed labor practices as either celebratory of the 
democratic and willful contributions of people or that which is deeply exploitative. Instead, he 
suggests 
for an inductive model of analysis that considers these two perspectives within the 
context of practices within the sites or systems themselves. This is all the more important 
when one analyzes emerging social enterprises, which attempt to fulfill a primary social, 
non-capitalist outcome while still maintaining a competitive position within the market 
(p. 468).  
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This is framed as part of a system of ‘creative capitalism’ that “merges leisure, freedom, even 
fantasy with the realities of serving a competitive capitalist firm.” Fish does underline a 
significant and growing challenge on intellectual property rights in the digital global network 
given that these digital laborers are being viewed more as ‘outsourced workers’ as this 
phenomenon becomes less marginal. Take the recent case of the Nyan Cat and the lawsuit 
against Warner Brothers. The Nyan Cat is a feline-themed internet meme. This video entails an 
online character with a cat’s face and a body resembling a horizontal breakfast bar with pink 
frosting, flying across the screen leaving a bright rainbow trail behind. Much like several 
YouTube phenomena that moves in mysterious ways, this particular video became a sensation 
and went viral. Later on, Warner Brothers’ game Scribblenauts used the Nyan Cat in their video 
game without the creator’s permission and is now facing a federal lawsuit for infringement of 
copyrights and trademarks. We can expect more of these incidents in the near future as these 
boundaries of labor and leisure and what is private and what is a public good has been deeply 
blurred in this digital sphere.   
While Fish takes on a position of hybridity, scholars such as Terranova (2009) point to the 
underlying ideology dictating these architectures, that which is more corporatized and capitalistic 
in nature. These spaces are seen as being far from the celebrated liberalized digital global market 
that promises a fair playing field for the digital laborer. She argues that these platforms are “less 
a space for employment opportunity and more a domain of precarity, job insecurity, free labor, 
and general exploitation” (p.).  We should not forget that these social network sites, in spite of 
their dominant leisure and social properties are also markets that follow economic and legal 
policies.  While labor activity can simultaneously be play, entertainment and leisure and 
contribute to the ‘global intellectual economy,’ it is still up for contention whether one can 
demand an economic value to this effort. Banks and Humphreys (2008) argue that we need to 
look at all fronts and power relations between all actors involved including the “non-monetary, 
social economies, and their central and increasingly constitutive role in monetary or financial 
economies.” In other words, to determine whether labor infringements are made, we have to 
determine if this is a consensual and collaborative relationship and recognize any form of 
compensation that is jointly agreed upon before we make it a matter of dispute. After all,  
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the power derived from the social economies is not necessarily consonant with that 
derived from financial economies. When there are abrasive encounters as we have 
described, it is not always clear who is in control and who the winners and losers are, but 
it is clear that it is not as straightforward as corporate winners and user losers. Here we 
need a better understanding of the agents and agencies emerging through social network 
markets. 
Last but not least, it is impossible to not address the underground global economy that digital 
leisure platforms stimulate such as the porn industry and the impact this has on globalization 
flows across these spaces. Matthew Zook (2003) has examined datasets on the location of 
content production, websites and hosting of the online adult industry to gauge to what extent 
these electronic spaces interact with the geographic realm, paying heed to the local histories, 
cultures and politics of these occupied terrains: 
The roles of these actors, however, are not simply determined by a spaceless logic of 
cyber interaction but by histories and economies of the physical places they inhabit. In 
short, the `space of flows' cannot be understood without reference to the `space of places' 
to which it connects. This geography also provides a valuable counterpoint to mainstream 
electronic commerce and highlights the ability of socially marginal and underground 
interests to use the Internet to form and connect in global networks. 
Also, much in line with the global city literature, certain cities are more permissive than others in 
their allowances of pornography, creating diverse spaces of regulation based on specific states 
and cities. For instance, Los Angeles and Amsterdam are more permissive and less litigious 
towards the adult industry and this unique localization and policy affects its digital leisure space 
in the nature of services offered and means of distribution and production of adult content. 
Hence, we need to keep in mind that there are three geographically relevant measures to 
understand the impact of globalization and physical location on these digital leisure networks, 
namely: (1) the production of content for the industry, (2) the creation and maintenance of 
websites to distribute content, and (3) the hosting of websites (Zook, 2003). Also, much like the 
trajectory of clusters and the core-periphery approach to the global city literature, there is a slow 
but growing shift from the Western command centers to periphery cities in the digital adult 
space. It is revealed that seventy percent of the adult content distributors are based in the United 
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States and countries with the highest user rates are Canada and Australia. However, the United 
Kingdom contrary to expectations has a relatively low level of Internet adult content distributors. 
Further, while West Europe is a large market, East European actors are central to the making of 
this industry, revealing linkages within this global flow of space. Further, countries such as 
Thailand and Hungary have recently become new centers for the creation of pornographic 
materials. There also seems to be a focus on specialization in adult sites with the United States, 
Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Australia taking the lead.   
 
Hence, while much on globalization of the Internet has celebrated the connectivity of people 
across national borders, few have paid attention to the underground interests that also leverage 
these platforms to create a global network. Democratic participation here take on a new meaning 
as the digital product in focus that flows between these borders is that which is marked as illegal 
depending on the nation state. Whether it is the fostering of terror networks, drug or human 
trafficking, these traditional forms of social and mass deviance have managed to capitalize on the 
affordances of digital leisure networks to enhance efficacy in their circulations, connections and 
communications. Thus, Zook remarks, “the geographical manifestation of these networks shares 
a similar structural logic with the global financial system, albeit with drastically different 
priorities, goals, and relevant places.” In fact, Castells (1998) recognized early on that there is a 
space of flows that takes on a “position of irrelevance” (p. 162) and is treated as invisible, 
however dominant its presence is based on what is deemed as productive and constructive spaces 
for society, be it at a material or virtual context. These deliberately excluded criminal realms 
however are very much part of the global flow and contribute to the geography of social network 
sites. In essence, these deviant spheres benefit deeply on the decentralized and fragmented nature 
of the transnational digital topography, protecting these realms and its participatory members 
against any one dominant nation state. In some sense, globalizing of digital space creates 
invisibility.  
 
As new ways of engineering information emerge and get appropriated, they also transform where 
the boundaries fall between SNS and the internet as we know it. In recent news (New Yorker, 
2013), Facebook announced its new Graph Search which gives users the ability to search their 
social networks for things like photos and restaurant recommendations: 
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For a long time, search has been one of the weaknesses of the site; now it might actually 
be useful. You can search for all the photos that you have “liked,” or all the restaurants in 
San Francisco that have been liked by your friends who like Lady Gaga. It pores over 
individualized information that no other search engine has; more interestingly, it 
represents a different way of thinking about searching, stressing the integration of 
information across your posts (and those of your friends), rather than just returning a 
particular page that seems to fit your criteria. 
 
Through this lens, it would give the impression that the cityscape is becoming more a playscape. 
However, one must not be swept away by novelty as much innovation for remodeling the 
underlying infrastructures has failed to take root, giving further credence to traditional 
architectures of command centers. But inevitably, new models will come by and threaten the 
relative stability of these structures, as they are still subject to varied digital and material 
movements of political, economic and social in nature.  
 
Lastly, much has been written on the issue of privacy in the Walled Gardens paper. We get the 
impression that this has become a transnational concern that pervades across cultures, pushing 
for stringent policy measures by the state. We see divergent schools of thought emerging 
including that of the United States and Europe in this matter. For the most part, United States 
align with a more self-voluntary and less state-regulatory approach believing that the digital 
sphere is still in its nascent stage and its future potential would be impeded by privacy 
regulations by the state. This would freeze the architectures to a high degree and have an adverse 
impact on innovation. From the European point of view, while innovation and economic 
prosperity is essential, freedom of a public sphere has to have the consumer’s interest at the heart 
of it. After all, they are the public and these architectures should be steered in the direction that is 
less violating of individual rights. Also, over the decades, consumers in these regions have 
demonstrated deeper concern about their privacy online and have contributed to this current 
momentum in policy debates. Yet, if we are to shift our attention to the emerging markets, 
another transnational public sphere emerges, one that is less concerned about privacy. It a recent 
study, it was found that Saudi Internet users were the top in the list when it came to sharing their 
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personal lives online (Arab News, June 2013). According to this US report on computing trends, 
Saudi’s expressed little concern in the sharing of most matters of their day to day lives through 
status updates, photos, videos and other links. India occupies second place in this category. 
According to the statistics, about 60 percent of Saudis surveyed said they share “everything” or 
“most things” online compared to 15 percent in the United States and 10 percent in France. The 
most dominant platforms used in Saudi Arabia are Snapchat, followed by Facebook and 
Instagram. Hence, we need to recognize that while indeed issues such as privacy has become a 
dominant contention within the digital leisure networks of Europe and the United States, these 
cannot be uncritically transferred to other transnational spheres, particularly in the so called 
periphery domains. While these regions continue to exercise disproportionate power onto the 
global landscape, there are multiple arenas in the emerging market realm where they are barely 
visible in their influence. Adopting the template of the digital global city does not necessitate the 
automatic transference of its concerns and issues.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While SNS differentiate themselves from the internet based on their dominant characterization of 
user-generated content and emphasis on the social and leisurely aspects, it is important to keep in 
mind that SNS continues to be embedded within the larger internet domain and shares much of 
the underlying technological architectures that allow these spaces to sustain themselves. In fact, 
one can argue that to some extent the SNS culture is pervading and influencing the shape of the 
internet as the coined term ‘Web 2.0’ implies, alerting us to a new era of a participatory and 
network culture.  To reconstitute this in metaphorical terms, the urban park distinguishes itself 
from the tedium of the cityscape as it enjoys the status of leisure and sociality amongst the 
masses. Yet, it is still part of the fabric of the city, and subscribes to the larger operations of 
social norms and legalities. These are more soft boundaries between the city and the park, and as 
urban parks take on a plurality of forms reflecting contemporary leisure practices and public 
spatial consumption such as shopping arcades and malls, and squares within the city confines, we 
are alerted to the fact that the public leisure sphere is becoming more commercialized and in 
need of closer scrutiny on regulations for protection of privacy in public domains. This is much 
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like the evolution of SNS as corporate interests have seeped into seemingly innocent leisure and 
open spaces and in fact, capitalize on the disarming nature of leisure to influence human 
behavior for commercial interests.  
 
Further, in the above reviews of globalizing of the internet and SNS, we see the persistence of 
the core-periphery nodes and hierarchies that are dictated by a host of factors that are political, 
corporate as well as affective and culturally based. While certain command centers persist such 
as Facebook, Youtube and Twitter, we also see the rise of a host of digital leisure networks that 
are becoming more issue, interest, group affiliation and location based such as that of Nextdoor, 
black planet, beautiful people and the like. We also witness the hybridization and indigenization 
of dominant global leisure networks such as Facebook wherein its usage allows for a diverse 
representation of spatial forms that may have little resemblance to the original Facebook ethos. 
In a sense, the more global these command centers get, the more nebulous its ideology becomes 
as it’s impossible to impose its unique socio-cultural norms onto its substantive transnational and 
transcultural digital inhabitants.  
 
Additionally, it can be argued that these SNS are far from disembedded from the nation state; 
they seem to nurture a complex relationship with this entity where they become web 
representations of the nation’s culture. Several new digital leisure platforms have been designed 
for specific regions and audiences such as South Korean’s Cyworld, Latin America’s Migente, 
and Germany’s Studivz, as well as Google’s Orkut (initially aimed for the United States 
audience to compete with MySpace and Facebook but eventually taken hold in Brazil). That said, 
the literature points us to an important factor of viewing these command centers not as individual 
nodes of power but rather as part of strategic clusters of circulating networks and capital. In the 
age of the hyperlink and hybermobile community, we need to pay more attention to the flows 
between these sites and not solely that of its individual structures as the former allows for more 
dynamism and change.  
 
We need to consider how digital leisure cannot be boxed in within the online world as 
participants mediate between the physical and the virtual, transforming offline moments into 
digital memories to be consumed and played with; how it regurgitates the past as an infinite and 
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affective present. As projects for making cities ‘smart’ and ‘fluid’ city are underway, so are its 
leisure counterpart; hence we see virtual museums and malls spring up as extensions of its 
tangible and concrete presence. As ways of engineering information emerge and get 
appropriated, they also transform where the boundaries fall between SNS and the internet as we 
know it. However, one must not be swept away by novelty as much innovation for remodeling 
the underlying infrastructures have failed to take root, giving further credence to dominant 
command centers of the leisure network. That said, it is a reminder that while dominant models 
remain relatively stable, they are still products of a host of practices and subject to challenge by 
shifts in the technological, the social and the cultural. 
 
While new information and communication technologies make possible the impressive blurring 
of lines between reality and fantasy, the real and the virtual, we should not forget that much of 
the world’s inhabitants reside in a pre-digital world and are the invisible publics that have 
somehow slipped past the database that appears omnipresent. Poverty, rurality, criminality, and 
the perverse gain little attention within this larger discourse on the globalizing of the internet and 
its leisure counterpart. Going back to the analogy, it’s much like examining a city without taking 
heed of their vast slums, often where half their inhabitants live, work and play. Hence, let’s use 
this opportunity to simultaneously enrich the conceptualizing of the city and the park, leisure and 
labor, and the virtual and the material by being more encompassing of the marginal and the 
diverse. 
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